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RECENT DECISIONS
CORPORATIONS---CIflZENSHIP OF MULTI-STATE CORPORATIONS-JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL CouRTs ON GnoUND OF DIVERSITY OF CrrzENsHP.--Plaintiffs, citizens of
New Jersey, sued defendant railroad corporation, incorporated in both New York
and New Jersey, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
alleging defendant to be a New York corporation. Defendant's motion to dismiss the
action for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that there was no diversity of citizen-
ship was granted. Upon appeal, held, judgment reversed. Gavin v. Hudson & Man-
hattan R. R., 185 F. 2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950).
The instant case raises the problem: where a corporation exists under the laws
of more than one state, of which state shall it be deemed a citizen for purposes
of federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship? The diversity of citizen-
ship requirement in the federal courts demands that each plaintiff be a citizen of
a state different from each defendant.1 This would usually be a practical impossi-
bility in the case of corporate parties if the citizenship of the stockholders be deter-
minative of the citizenship of the corporation. The federal courts solved the diffi-
culty by regarding a suit by or against a corporation as one in reality by or against
the stockholders and for the purposes of jurisdiction it is conclusively presumed
that all of them are citizens of the state whose laws created the corporation.2
In the case of a corporation existing under the laws of more than one state, the
effect of this conclusive presumption will depend upon the mode of existence of
the corporation in the state of secondary incorporation. Thus, where a corpora-
tion, incorporated under the laws of one state, exists in another state by virtue of re-
incorporation therein the rule has been that there exists in each state a separate
corporation and for purposes of diversity of citizenship the corporation will be
regarded as a citizen of the state where suit is broughL3
But where existence in the state of secondary incorporation is by virtue of a mere
license to do business there, the general rule is that no new corporation is created
and, therefore, for purposes of federal jurisdiction the corporation will be regarded
as a citizen of the state which first gave it life.4 In Southern Ry. v. Allisonl)i a
corporation, originally incorporated in Virginia, filed a copy of its charter and by-
laws with the Secretary of State of North Carolina. By such acts, under a North
Carolina statute it became a domestic North Carolina corporation and was en-
titled to the rights and privileges and was subject to the jurisdiction of the North
Carolina courts as fully as if originally created there. The Court held that while for
most purposes it might be a domestic North Carolina corporation the mere filing
of a copy of its original charter and a copy of its by-laws did not make it a
1. 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1948). Strawbridge et al. v. Curtiss et al, 3 Cranch. 267
(U. S. 1806).
2. Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444 (1876); Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio P. R., 16 How.
314 (U. S. 1353); cf. Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579 (1905), where in effect the
fiction of citizenship in the state of incorporation is disregarded.
3. Geoffroy et al. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 16 F. 2d 1017 (Ist Cir. 1927);
Peterborough R. R. v. Boston & B. R. R, 239 Fed. 97 (Ist Cir. 1917); Missouri Pac.
Ry. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753 (8th Cir. 1895); see Ohio & Bisslisippi I. R. v. Wheeler.
1 Black 286, 297 (U. S. 1861).
4. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. James, 161 U. S. 545 (1896).
5. 190 U. S. 326 (1903).
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"citizen" of North Carolina for purposes of federal jurisdiction. However, if the
court finds as a fact that a new corporation was created in the second state, the
federal courts will give it effect'for jurisdictional purposes.0
Thus the fundamental test which will determine citizenship has been: has a new
and distinct legal entity been created in the second state? If so, then the stock-
holders of each corporate entity will be deemed citizens of the state of incorpora-
tion or of reincorporation when the corporation is sued in the federal courts of the
state of incorporation or of reincorporation.
The classification outlined above has become well-defined and adopted in later
cases in other circuits. For example, in the To=n of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 7 a suit by a railroad corporation, incorporated in both Virginia and North
Carolina, brought in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina against a municipal corporation of North Carolina, it was held that plaintiff
must be regarded as a "citizen" of North Carolina and, therefore, there was no
diversity of citizenship. The court analyzes the development of the law on the sub-
ject, pointing out that where a corporation has reincorporated in another state,
the corporation shall be deemed a "citizen" of that state, for purposes of jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, when sued in the federal courts of that state.8
In the instant case, the court rejects these holdings, in reaching the conclusion
that the defendant may be regarded as a "citizen" of New York, even though in-
corporated in New Jersey, the state of plaintiff's citizenship and the state where
suit is brought. The court recognizes that this holding is directly contra to the de-
cided cases of the other circuits but offers no cogent argument to support its view
other than it is "better in practice because it does not require useless ritual in
instituting a suit away from home."9
One must agree with the court in the instant case that "what is needed here is a
clear guide which will tell the parties where they may sue in federal court and
where they may not."'1  But it is submitted that the refusal here to conform with
the weight of authority, even though no rule of law necessitates such conformity,
serves only to obfuscate an existing "clear guide."
6. It must be noted further that where a corporation exists in a second state by virtue
of a union with a domestic corporation in that state, the determination of the jurisdic-
tional question depends on whether there is a consolidation or a merger. Where there
has been a true consolidation or merger so that the old corporation has ceased to exist,
the surviving corporation remains a corporation and citizen of the state which created It.
Westheider v. Wabash R. R., 115 Fed. 840 (S. D. 11. 1902). But if there has been a
mere consolidation of management and control, then each of the corporations remains and
the rules as to re-incorporation will determine the jurisdictional question. Patch v.
Wabash R. R., 207 U. S. 277 (1907).
7. 81 F. 2d 60 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 682 (1936).
8. Accord, Geoffroy et al. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 16 F. 2d 1017 (1st Cir.
1927) ; Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944 (6th Cir. 1909); Starke v. New
York, Chicago & St. Louis R. R., 180 F. 2d 569 (7th Cir. 1950); Missouri Pac. Ry. v.
Meeh, 69 Fed. 753 (8th Cir. 1895).
9. 185 F. 2d 104, 107 (3d Cir. 1950). It must be noted that in the principal case,
there would have been no jurisdictional problem, even under the prevailing view, If
plaintiff had instituted suit in the federal courts for the district of New York. This fact
probably had some influence upon the court's decision.
10. Id. at 106.
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The present decision is to be regretted, therefore, because it disturbs the unanimity
of the federal courts and the stability of the law on this point. It would seem that
a legal fiction or presumption of law, such as here involved, should be applied in a
manner which will effectuate stability and predictability in the law, even where to
do so provides "an effective means of promoting additional passenger business for
the Hudson & Manhattan. .. .
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ACTION AT LAW FOp DAAGEs-FRAUD-SEPAPAToz
AGREPMENT.-Plaintiff commenced an action for divorce in New Jersey. During
the pendency of said action, an agreement was made vwhereby plaintiff accepted
$20,000 in lieu of support. This agreement was not incorporated in the New Jersey
divorce decree but provided that in the case of a divorce, its provisions would have
the same force and effect as though inserted at length in the decree. The complaint
alleged that defendant falsely and fraudulently had represented his net worth to
be $50,000, when in fact it was $500,000. Plaintiff sued at law for damages as a
result of the alleged fraud. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant
to subdivisions (2) and (5) of Rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Practice upon the
grounds that (1) the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action;
(2) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Held, judgment of the Appellate Division, reversing on the law an order of the
Supreme Court at Special Term which denied defendant's motion, affirmed, one
judge dissenting. Weintraub v. Weintraub, 302 N. Y. 104, 96 N. E. 2d 724 (1951).
The issue is whether a court has jurisdiction to entertain an action at law and
award damages based upon defendant's true financial worth, which would have the
effect of providing for plaintiff's maintenance and support. Since a married voman
has a right to contract with her husband,1 a valid contract for support and mainte-
nance may be entered into if the parties have already contemplated a separa-
tion.2 The agreement will be upheld unless it is unfair or unjust. The law is wvell
settled that where a person has been induced to enter into a contract by fraud, he
may pursue one of three remedies: rescind the contract absolutely and sue at law
to recover the consideration paid; bring an action in equity to rescind the contract;
or retain what he has received, and bring an action at law to recover the damages
sustained because of the fraud a
The courts have long recognized the right to bring an action in equity to set aside
a separation agreement upon the ground of fraud and, if relief is granted, it must
be set aside in its entirety.4 In Johnson v. Johnson,,P relied upon by the majority in
11. Id. at 105.
1. N. Y. Domr. REL. LAw § 51.
2. Winter v. Winter, 191 N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 382 (1903); LaMontagne v. LaMontagne,
239 App. Div. 352, 267 N. Y. Supp. 148 (1st Dep't 1933), af'd ithout opinion, 264
N. Y. 552, 191 N. E. 560 (1934); Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N. Y.
Supp. 118 (3d Dep't 1930); McGean v. Parsons, 150 App. Div. 208, 134 N. Y. Supp. 649
(Ist Dep't 1912).
3. Goldsmith v. National Container Corp., 287 N. Y. 438, 40 N. E. 2d 242 (1942);
Sager v. Friedman et al., 270 N. Y. 472, 1 N. E. 2d 971 (1936); Vail v. Reynolds, 118
N. Y. 297, 23 N. E. 301 (1890); Gould v. Cayuga County Nat. Bank, 86 N. Y. 7S (181).
4. Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N. Y. 561, 100 N. E. 408 (1912); Winter v. Winter, 191
1951]
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support of its refusal of jurisdiction, the wife did not seek to set the agreement
aside in its entirety, but sought increased alimony which the court could not grant so
long as the agreement remained in effect. But in refusing to grant relief, it would
seem that the court relied solely on general equitable principles. As in the case
of any contract, a separation agreement if set aside for fraud or duress must be set
aside in its entirety. The court cannot make a new agreement for the parties differ-
ent from the one voluntarily adopted by them. Thus the Johnson case disposed of
its problem as it would have done in any contract action and it did not appear that
it refused jurisdiction over the subject matter.0 The dissenting opinion, in the
instant case, substantially concurs with this conclusion.
Since the courts have recognized the parties' right to contract in regard to support
and maintenance and the cases affirm the wife's right to pursue her remedy in
equity, it is a natural inference that she should be able to pursue her action at law
for damages as in any other contract action. However, justification for the result
reached by the majority in the instant case may be found in public policy. It has
long been the policy of the state to regard the control and regulation of marriage
and the necessary incidents thereto with special care and attention in the domestic
relations courts. It was with this'view in mind that the matrimonial statutes were
enacted. Under such statutes a court was given brbad powers to weigh the situation
of both husband and wife and to make provisions for support and maintenance as
part of a separation or divorce decree.7 When the occasion arises which requires
the consideration of such matters as a necessary element in awarding relief, it would
appear to be more desirable to leave the deliberation in the hands of a judge in a
matrimonial action than to throw open the door and intermingle these matters with
other types of litigation by letting a jury pass upon them merely because a cause
of action at law has been established. Decisions in equity actions, setting aside
separation agreements for fraud and granting complete rescission in no way infringe
upon matrimonial matters since they merely involve the freeing of plaintiff from the
yoke of fraud and leave her as she would have been had she not entered into the
fraudulently induced agreement. But in an action at law for damages it would be
necessary for the jury to take into consideration matters of support and mainte-
nance and give affirmative aid based thereon. This would appear to constitute
infringement upon matrimonial jurisdiction. It is submitted that public policy de-
mands the keeping of such matters in their natural environment and should prevent
the opening up of an entirely new field of litigation.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-SEPARATION-CONTINUED RESIDENCE OF SPOUSES IN SAME
APARTMENT As PRECLUDING AcTioN.-Plaintiff wife brought an action for cruel and
inhuman treatment and such conduct on the part of the defendant as rendered it
unsafe and improper for plaintiff to live with him. On .appeal from a judgment in
favor of plaintiff, keld, per curiam, one justice dissenting, reversed and complaint
dismissed on the ground that the parties had continued to reside in the same apart-
ment. Berman v. Berman, 277 App. Div. 560, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 206 (1st Dep't 1950).
N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 382 (1908); Hungerford v. Hungerford, 161 N. Y, 550, 56 N. E. 117
(1900) ; Pelz v. Pelz, 156 App. Div. 756, 142 N. Y. Supp. 54 (1st Dep't 1913).
S. 206 N. Y. 561, 100 N. E. 408 (1912).
6. Id. at 567, 100 N. E. at 410.
7. N. Y. Civ. PRc. AcT §§ 1169, 1180.
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In dismissing the complaint the majority of the court imposed, as a prerequisite
to the commencement of a separation action, the obligation of leaving the other
party and maintaining a separate residence. The sole fact of continued residence in
the same apartment was treated as conclusive evidence that the parties had not in
fact separated despite a finding that they "have not been living together as husband
and wife and . . . have been living as separate lives as two people could do within
the confines of a small apartment."' Continued occupancy of the same apartment
was considered by the dissent merely as evidential of the continuance of the marital
relation. Thus upon a finding that the marital amenities no longer were observed
by the spouses no value in the fact of identical residence could be discerned that
would necessitate a denial of the relief sought.
No doubt can be entertained as to the incongruity of a judicial separation of
parties who have not in fact separated from each other. It is on the proposition
that continued residence indicates conclusively that the parties have not separated
that a different criterion would appear to be warranted.
Authority for the position of the dissent may be found in the case of List v. List2
where the question arose from facts similar to the principal case. The court in that
case declined to adopt "a mere rule of thumb by saying that in every case moving
out is a sine qua ino of legal relief. . . . It was held that all the circumstances
should be considered in determining the relationship of the parties. In Pedersen v.
Pedersen where it was urged that a wife was prevented from maintaining a suit
for limited divorce and alimony on the ground that the parties were still living
under the same roof, the court determined that the spouse must withdraw, not from
the marital residence, but from marital relations on the ground that "the essential
thing is not separate roofs, but separate lives-that the parties so live, whether
under one roof or two, as to abandon, with apparent permanency of intention, the
relation of husband and wife. . . .", As long as the marital relationship was ter-
minated, and consequently any defense of condonation predicated upon conjugal co-
habitation precluded,6 the spouse was considered as having satisfied the requisite
that the parties must first separate themselves before an action for a judicial
separation will be entertained.7
1. 277 App. Div. 560, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 206, 207 (1950).
2. 186 Misc. 261, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1946). But see, Collins v. Collins, &0
N. Y. 1 (1880).
3. Id. at 264, 61 N. Y. S. 2d at 811.
4. 107 F. 2d 227 (D. C. Cir. 1939).
S. Id. at 232.
6. ". . . all that is required of the wife is that she so segregate herself from her
husband as to avoid condoning the acts which she charges as the basis for the divorce
or other relief she seeks." Ibid. In answering defendant's contention that the defense of
condonation had been established by a showing that the spouses resided together the
court wrote in Graham v. Graham: "The general presumption is that the husband and
wife living in the same house, live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation .... But this,
as every other presumption, may be met and overcome by proof of facts or circum-
stances which destroy the probability, from which presumption sprin-, that married
persons living in the same house maintain marital relations." 50 N. J. Eq. 701, 705, 25
At. 358, 363 (1892).
7. "The Pedersen case does not depart from the established rule that to entitle the
wife to a temporary allowance for maintenance she must live separate and apart from the
1951]
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The fact of continued residency would appear to be pertinent only as it is infer-
ential of continued conjugal relations-i.e., whether in fact the parties resided as
husband and wife.8 It would seem that the continuance of a human relationship
which contemplates factors other than the incident of similar residence cannot be
established conclusively by the fact of remaining in the same residence.9
A further consideration of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of acquiring sepa-
rate accommodations, especially for persons within the jurisdiction of the court
in the instant case, would appear to present a situation incapable of solution for
a spouse even in a case where a preliminary motion for temporary alimony had
been granted.' 0 The requisite of a separate residence should be insisted upon only
where the severance of the marital relationship could not otherwise be established
by the spouse seeking judicial relief."
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-VALIDITY OF SEPARATION AGREEMENT CONDITIONED ON
DvoRcEM-In an action by a wife to recover sums due under a separation agreement,
the husband pleaded as a defense that the agreement was void as it tended
directly to promote the dissolution of the marriage. The agreement, which was
made after a separation but prior to the commencement of an action for divorce,
provided for weekly payments to the wife of $90.00 and further stipulated
that on the sixth of June 1949 he would pay her $25,000 and transfer to her his
automobile. It also provided that if the parties were still married on June first,
the agreement would no longer bind either party. Plaintiff moved for summary
husband. All that the Pedersen case holds is that there may be separation of the parties
even while they live under the same roof; that such fact of living under the same roof
is only a circumstance to be weighed with all other facts and circumstances in deter-
mining whether the parties are in fact separated." Cooper v. Cooper, 30 F. Supp. 151,
152 (D. C. 1939).
8. In disregarding a husband's contention that he had not deserted his wife since he
resided in the same house with her, one court has stated: "Matrimonial cohabitation
must certainly comprehend a living together as husband and wife, embracing relative
duties as such. Otherwise, all the married couples residing in a hotel, boarding or lodging
house, might be said to be cohabitating promiscuously." Stern v. Stern, 5 Colo. 55, 56
(1879). Accord, Nixon v. Nixon, 127 Pa. Super. 407, 193 At. 132 (1937), rev'd on other
grounds, 329 Pa. 256, 198 Atl. 154 (1938).
9. In Rector v. Rector, 78 N. J. Eq. 386, 79 AUt. 295 (1911), the court held that the
fact of residing under the same roof did not of itself predicate the continuance of the
conjugal relation. It stated "wherever one spouse, without justifiable reason, refuses for
the statutory period to have sexual intercourse with the other, and withdraws from all
other marital duties than merely living under the same roof in the same relationship that
could exist between a man and his housekeeper or a woman and her boarder-a condi-
tion in which the fact that she is the wife and he is the husband is of no consequence
whatever in their relation and method of living together-the desertion exists. . . ." Id. at
407, 79 AUt. at 303. Cf., Pedersen v. Pedersen, 107 F. 2d 227 (D. C. Cir. 1939).
10. See Speltzer v. Speltzer, 125 N. Y. L. J. 961, Col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 1951).
11. In a case decided subsequent to the principal case ihe Appellate Division, Second
Department, in a memorandum opinion disapproved the ruling of the majority of the
court in the principal case. Lowenfish v. Lowenfish, App. Div. , 103 N. Y. S.
2d 357 (2d Dep't 1951).
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judgment. Held, motion granted upon the ground that the agreement was binding
and enforceable although a substantial inducement for obtaining a divorce was held
out to the plaintiff wife. Abeles v. Abeles, et al., 197 Mfisc. 913, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 423
(Sup. Ct. 1950).
The issue in the instant case' is expressly covered by Section 51 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law which provides in part that "a husband and wife
cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage...." This provision has been inter-
preted as preventing the use of separation agreements by one spouse as a direct
inducement for the dissolution of the marital bond.2 In Lake vi. Lake3 the court,
while recognizing the right of a separated husband and wife to provide by contract
for the support and maintenance of the latter, refused to sustain the validity of a
contract which would only benefit the wife in the event of a divorce.
In making its decision the court in the instant case was constrained to hold as
it did on the authority of Butler v. Marcus,4 admitting however, that the agreement
in that case provided both an inducement and a reward for obtaining a divorce.
The court was unable to find a distinction between the case before it and the Butler
case. There is, however, a marked difference in the facts of the two cases which
may form a sound basis for distinction. While in the Butler case, as in the instant
case, the agreement provided for substantial payments during the period between
separation and the institution of divorce proceedings and conditioned the fulfillment
of the agreement upon a divorce, the agreement in the former case also provided
for the establishment of a testamentary trust by the husband in return for the re-
linquishment by the wife of her dower right and her joinder in certain realty transac-
tions.3 In other words the divorce was not the sole inducement for the provision
made by the husband. In the instant case the divorce decree constitutes the sole
exchange for the large cash payment and the automobile.
A possible solution to the problem is offered in a distinction voiced by both the
Federal and the New York courts. In Moore v. MooreG the court, when called upon
1. It should be noted that here the agreement was made after the separation and the
question of the validity of a pre-separation agreement, presented in cases such as Winter v.
Winter, 191 N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 382 (1908), does not arise. LaMontagne v. La Montagne,
239 App. Div. 352, 267 N. Y. Supp. 148 (ist Dep't 1933), aff'd mem., 264 N. Y. 552, 191
N. E. 560 (1934), pointed out that a separation agreement executed by parties while
living together contemplating an immediate separation is valid while one contemplating
a possible future separation or one contingent on the happening of a future event is un-
enforceable. For cases sustaining the validity of separation agreements while a divorce
action is pending see Werner v. Werner, 153 App. Div. 719, 138 N. Y. Supp. 633 (Ist
Dep't 1912); Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 644, 141 N. Y. Supp.
1065 (1st Dep't 1913).
2. Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N. Y. 31, 47 N. E. 2d 681 (1943).
3. 136 App. Div. 47, 119 N. Y. Supp. 686 (3d Dep't 1909).
4. 264 N. Y. 519, 191 N. E. $44 (1934).
5. These facts appear in the record on appeal.
6. 255 Fed. 497 (3d Cir. 1919), where the court said: "He undertook to support her
for her life, and to do this, he bound 'his heirs, executors, and administrators' to con-
tinue payments for her support after his death. By this promise, the wife was shown,
that if she succeeded in getting a divorce, she would receive more than the lawe would
award her, even if the law were as she thought it. This was a substantial inducement to
her to prosecute her divorce proceeding to the decree on which alone she could reap the
1951]
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to determine the validity of a separation agreement conditioned upon divorce,
adopted the test: Do the benefits of the separation agreement proffered to the wife
substantially outweigh the provisions a divorce court would award her and thereby
induce a divorce as the only means of obtaining the excess benefits offered. Yates v.
Yates7 indicates that New York is in accord with this view. Here a test is supplied
which is much more specific than the one stated in the Lake case. Whether an agree-
ment does or does not directly tend to promote a divorce can be more readily
ascertained by determining whether or not the contractual benefits substantially out-
weigh the usual grant of a divorce court. A court, it is true, in applying the prin-
ciple advanced, must pause and consider what it would award if a support action
was before it, and then determine whether or not the agreement is substantially in
excess of this amount, but this presents a more concrete test than attempting to
decide generally whether the agreement directly tends to promote a divorce.
The principle advanced is not in conflict with existing decisions and can readily
be applied to them. In Gould v. Goulds the extra benefit involved a guarantee of
payment by the father which would be unobtainable in a separation action. In the
Lake case, a lump sum settlement 9 was to be made after the divorce. In Schley v.
Andrews' ° the agreement provided for $200 per month, the procurement of an in-
surance policy for $20,000 in favor of the wife, and the confession of a $35,000
judgment as collateral security for the monthly payments. In all these cases, the
benefits offered to the wife would not be granted by a court in a separation action.
The only way the wife could obtain the benefit held out to her was by fulfilling
the agreement, and the courts held that the agreements were void as against
public policy. These cases correspond strikingly with the instant case. The only
way the wife in the instant case could obtain the automobile or the lump sum
payment over and above the support payments was by fulfilling the agreement,
for the provisions did not become effective until after the final decree had
been granted. The agreement in the Butler case, on the other hand, can be dis-
tinguished in that it merely provided the wife with that to which she would be
promised reward." Id. at 502. See also Spreckels v. Wakefield, 286 Fed. 465 (9th
Cir. 1923).
7. 183 Misc. 934, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1944). In Goodman v. Goodman, 274
App. Div. 287, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 62 (1st Dep't 1948), after referring to the Yates case,
the court found that the $5,000 which the husband agreed to pay to his wife in lieu of
support in event of her obtaining an annulment decree was a reasonable amount and did
not have a'direct tendency to bring about an annulment which would not otherwise have
occurred.
8. 261 App. Div. 733, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 54 (Ist Dep't 1941).
9. For cases in point involving the validity of such agreements see Kyff v. Kyff, 286
N. Y. 71, 35 N. E. 2d 655 (1941); Heflin v. Heflin, 177 Misc. 290, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 412
(Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd mern., 263 App. Div. 714, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 123 (Ist Dep't 1941). A
distinction is made between cases where the parties are still married and those where
the agreement is made after a termination of the marriage. In the former class of cases
the court will set aside the agreement and provide for the support of the spouse if she
is in danger of becoming a public charge, or if the sum agreed upon is deemed Inadequate
in the light of the husband's resources. In such cases it is deemed an attempt by the,
husband to purchase an exemption from his duties. In the latter class of cases, the agree-
ment will be upheld in the absence of fraud.
10. 225 N. Y. 110, 121 N. E. 812 (1919).
[Vol. 20
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legally entitled in an action for a divorce, i.e., support from her husband. The addi-
tional trust arrangement in lieu of dower rights, does not operate to make an other-
wise valid agreement into one inducing a divorce.
JoINT TENANCY-RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHI WHERE ONE CO-TENANT MURDERS THE
OrTHEn.-At the time the defendant murdered his wife they owned certain property
as joint tenants. The wife's next of kin brought suit seeking a declaration that
since the defendant unlawfully took the life of his wife, he holds the title to an
undivided one-half of this property for the benefit of the plaintiffs and that the
other one-half interest is held in trust for his own use during his lifetime and that
after his death, the title vests in the plaintiffs. The lower court dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, held, decree affirmed, on
the ground that the declaration of a constructive trust would, in effect, work a for-
feiture of defendant's vested property rights in violation of the state's constitutional
provision forbidding forfeiture of estate as punishment for a crime. Welsh v. James,
95 N. E. 2d 872 (Ill. 1950).
The fundamental doctrine upon which the plaintiff's case is based is that equity
will not permit a wrongdoer to profit by his own wrong.1 As a corollary to this,
another rule has been developed to the effect that whenever the legal title to prop-
erty has been obtained under circumstances which render it unconscionable for the
holder to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, a constructive trust will be im-
pressed on the property thus acquired in favor of the one who is equitably entitled
to it, although he may never perhaps have had any legal estate therein.2
A group of cases, analogous to the one under consideration, in which both of the
above principles are applicable, concern situations where a devisee or distributee
feloniously kills his testator or intestate ancestor.3 The view taken by the New York
courts is that such a wrongdoer is not prevented from acquiring legal title to the
property devised or inherited, but because of the iniquitous mode of acquisition,
equity will declare him a constructive trustee of the property for the benefit of
those otherwise entitled to take.4 There are decisions to the contrary* which permit
1. "The principle is fundamental that no man shall be permitted to profit by his
own wrong. It enters, by implication, into all contracts and all laws." People v. Schmidt,
216 N. Y. 324, 341, 110 N. E. 945, 950 (1915).
2. 4 PoXEROy, E u= JuRzSPRuDENCE § 1053 (5th ed. 1941).
3. In a number of states, statutes have been enacted dealing with the rights of a
murderer to inherit or take by devise from his victim. See generally, Wade, Acquition
of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 Hntv. L. REv. 715
(1936); 3 BOGERT, Tsis AsxN TRusnms 53 (1946).
4. Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896), modifying the decision
in Riggs et al. v. Palmer et al., 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889), which had held that
a gift in a will to one who murdered his testator to prevent the will's revocation was in-
effectual to pass any title to him. For a critical analysis of Riggs v. Palmer, supra, and
the similar case of Shellenberger v. Ransom et al, 31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W. 700 (1891) see
4 HAav. L. REv. 394 (1891). See also Whitney et al. v. Lott et al., 134 N. J. Eq. 586,
36 A. 2d 888 (1944) and Garner et al. v. Phillips et al., 229 N. C. 160, 47 S. E. 2d
845 (1948).
5. Wall et al. v. Pfanschmidt et al., 265 I1. 180, 106 N. E. 785 (1914); McAllister
et al. v. Fair et al., 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. 112 (1906); Shellenberger v. Ransom et a.,
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the murderer to retain the legal and beneficial interest in the property, on the ground
that the judiciary is powerless to create an exception to the legislative fiat as em-
bodied in the statutes on wills and intestacy.0 Dean Ames points out that the courts
in the latter cases have overlooked the principle that equity, acting in personam,
can restrain the wrongdoer from beneficially enjoying such property by compelling
him to hold it as constructive trustee for those persons, exclusive of himself, who
would have taken, had the victim's death been natural.1 The application of this
equitable doctrine does not cause an exception to be made to the statutes, but on
the contrary, admits of their efficacy as a conduit of title.8 A similar problem is
presented in a situation where the beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the
insured. There is practically unanimity of opinion that under such circumstances it
would be a travesty of justice to permit .such a person to profit because of his
crime and accordingly the courts declare that he holds his interest under the policy
upon a constructive trust for the benefit of the estate of the insured.0
In none of the foregoing instances has the wrongdoer been deprived, because of
the imposition of the trust, of any beneficial rights which were vested in him prior
to the homicide. In each case the court acted upon property the murderer obtained
after and by virtue of the death of his victim. Consequently, the problem of for-
feiture of estate10 was not involved" any more than it would have been in a case
where one obtained a title through fraud, undue influence or other circumstances
which would render it unconscionable for him to retain the beneficial interest therein,
and where a .court of equity would have unhesitatingly lent its aid by imposing a
constructive trust.'
2
In the instant case, however, the defendant did have a vested beneficial interest
in the property involved, he and his victim having been joint tenants a long before
the homicide was committed. If the court were asked to divest the wrongdoer of all
his rights therein because of his crime, then concededly a true issue oif
41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894), in which the lower court's decision, sapra note 4, was
reversed; In re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Ad. 637 (1895). For a comparison
between these cases and the ones cited in note 4, supra, see 30 HAav. L. REv. 622 (1917).
6. In Deem et al. v. Milliken et al., 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 357 (1892), aqld mern., 53
Ohio St. 668, 44 N. E. 1134 (1895), it was held that where there are explicit rules gov-
erning the descent of property and they contain nothing to justify exclusion, the one
upon whom the law casts the property cannot, because of the murder by him of his
ancestor, be divested of it by the court.
7. Ames, Can A Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It? In LEcTuRzS oN
LwGAL HsroRY 311 (1913).
8. Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540 (1896); Whitney v. Lott, 134
N. J. Eq. 586, 36 A. 2d 888 (1944).
9. New York Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 (1886). See cases
cited in VANcE, Insu A cF § 156 (2d ed. 1930).
10. A forfeiture is a "punishment annexed by law to some illegal act or negligence In
the owner of lands, tenements or hereditaments, whereby he loses all his interest therein,
and they become vested in the party injured as a recompense for the wrong which he
alone, or the public together with himself hath sustained." 2 BL. CoaMM. *267.
11. RESTATEMENT, REsTrruTioN § 187 comment c (1937).
12. For the scope of constructive trusts generally, see 4 PoMERoY, EQuInT JUaSPRU-
DENCE § 1044-1058a (5th ed. 1941).
13. See 2 TIrFAN-Y, RvM- PROPERTY § 418 (3d ed. 1939).
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forfeiture would be present, and the decision denying this relief would be sound.14
However, the plaintiffs here did not seek such an extended coverage in their prayer
for a constructive trust. Actually they sought only that beneficial interest by which
the wrongdoer's previously vested estate was enlarged by virtue of his crime.r5 But
adhering strictly to the common law rules of property, the court maintained that
to grant such relief would be to work a forfeiture of defendant's pre-existing right
of survivorship, ie., his right to the whole of the estate was surviving joint tenanLt
The problem is substantially the same when either a husband or wife, holding
property as tenants by the entirety,' 7 feloniously kills the other. In the absence of
statute,'8 the decisions are by no means in harmony as to the rights of the sur-
viving spouse. Some states take the position reached in the instant case, that the
murderer is entitled to retain the entire property.' 0 Exactly the opposite result
has been reached in New York. In Van Alstync et al. v. Tuffy et al, 20 the court
ruled that the realty involved should pass to the heirs of the murdered vife. It
was held in In re Santourian's Estate2 that the entire property should be immedi-
ately turned over to the administrator of the deceased joint tenant, the court de-
claring: "It would be abhorrent of all the rules of equity and justice to permit the
murderer to retain title under the circumstances." 22
In Bryant v. Bryant23 and Sherman et al. v. Weber et al.,24 the courts of North
Carolina and New Jersey, respectively, recognized that to divest the wrongdoer of
all his interest in the property would involve an unlawful forfeiture, but on the
other hand to permit him to retain the entire estate, as the surviving tenant by
entirety, would be permitting him to reap a benefit by his crime. By applying the
device of the constructive trust, the necessity of choosing one or the other of these
14. But cf. In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 663, 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct.
1925), infra note 21.
15. RESTATEmmNT, REsTrrunoo § 188 (1937) reads: "Where two persons have an in-
terest in property and the interest of one of them is enlarged by his murder of the other,
to the extent to whicl it is enlarged he holds it upon constructive trust for the estate
of the other." (italics supplied).
16. 95 N. E. 2d 872, 875. Accord, Oleff et al. v. Hodapp et al, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195
N. E. 83 (1935); Di Lallo v. Corea, 19 Pa. D. & C. 282 (1933).
17. See 2 TirsA'Y, REn PROPERTY § 430 (3d ed. 1939).
18. See note 3 supra.
19. Wenker v. Landon et al., 161 Ore. 265, 88 P. 2d 971 (1939); Hamer v. Kennan,
16 Pa. D. & C. 395 (1931); Beddingfield et al. v. Estill & Newman et al., 118 Tenn. 39,
100 S. W. 108 (1907).
20. 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. CL 1918). "The social interest served
by refusing to permit the criminal to profit by his crime is greater than that served by
the preservation and enforcement of legal rights of ownership." CAmzo, Tun NAT=OX
oF TE JUDIAL PROcEss 43 (1921).
21. 125 Msc. 668, 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925).
22. Id. at 670, 212 N. Y. Supp. at 118. This result was reached without mentioning
the issue of forfeiture. Apparently the court's attention was not directed to § 512 of the
N. Y. PENAL LAw which, like the Illinois constitutional provision in the principal case,
prohibits forfeiture of estate for a crime. See also Bierbrauer et al. v. Moran, 244 App.
Div. 87, 279 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dep't 1935).
23. 193 N. C. 372 (1927).
24. 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 AUt. 517 (1933).
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two undesirable extremes was avoided. The result reached was that the slayer kept
his vested life interest in the property but held one-half the property during a period
representing the life expectancy of his deceased wife as trustee ex vialefido for her
heirs. In the Bryant case it was found that the victim had a greater life expec-
tancy and the court accordingly decreed that upon the husband's death the entire
estate would pass to the wife's heirs.m The murderer had the greater life expectancy
in the Sherman case however and so the heir of the deceased wife was awarded only
a one-half interest in the net income of the property for the number of years, com-
puted by the standard mortality tables, that she would have lived had the murder
not been committed.
In a similar case26 in Missouri recently it was conceded that the common law
relative to estates by entirety provides that the survivor take all. But the court said
"9one must not only be a survivor in fact but also a survivor in contemplation of
law."27 Since there was neither a lawful divestiture of the wife's interest, nor a law-
ful survivorship of the husband, it was decreed that the property "should go just
as provided where there is a common calamity and both tenants die simul-
taneously." 28 Thus the wife's heir was awarded one-half of the estate and the
husband permitted to retain the other half, both now holding as tenants in common.
No forfeiture was caused since, although the husband, as surviving tenant by
entirety, was said to have been seized of the whole estate under the original grant
and not alone by virtue of his wife's death, in fact this was just a fiction of owner-
ship which gave way when equitable principles intervened and individual interests
were sought to be defined and declared. )
The results reached by either of these approaches, blending the common law rules
of property and the equitable maxim above discussed, commend themselves as
more desirable than that reached in the instant case.
PowERs OF APPOINTMENT-CREATION OF A SPECIAL POWER BY A DONEE OF A
SPECIAL POWER.-Testator was the life beneficiary of a testamentary trust with
power to appoint the remainder to his children and descendants "in such manner
and in such proportions as my said son may direct and appoint by his last Will
and Testament." He exercised this special power by appointing the remainder in
equal shares to his five children in trust for life, giving each child a special power,
substantially the same as the power he had received, to appoint the remainder of
his or her share by will. The children first sought to have the trust declared invalid
and to take the whole remainder in accordance with a provision over in default of
appointment. This failing, and the children fearing an additional estate tax on their
powers, they renounced the powers granted. The executors then petitioned the
Surrogate to determine the validity of the testator's exercise of his power and of
25. The court stated that even in the absence of such a finding, equity would probably
give the innocent victim the benefit of the doubt as to which one would have been the
natural survivor. Compare this dictum with the more realistic view taken in Sherman
v. Weber, supra note 24.
26. Grose et al. v. Holland et al., 357 Mo. 874, 211 S. W. 2d 464 (1948).
27. Id. at 878, 211 S. W. 2d at 466.
28. Id. at 880, 211 S. W. 2d at 467.
29. See also Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. 2d 757 (1930), and Holmes
v. Kansas City, 209 Mo. 513, 108 S. W. 9 (1908).
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the children's renunciation of theirs. Held, the creation of a special power by virtue
of the special power is valid, and the renunciation by the donees is also valid. In re
Finucane's Will, - Misc. - , 100 N. Y. S. 2d 1005 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
The donee of a power' may exercise it in accordance with its terms. When doubt
arises as to the power granted, the controlling factor is the intent of the grantor.2
Where the exercise of a power calls for the use of the donees discretion, and no
delegation is authorized by the donor, a delegation of this exercise is generally said
to be void, just as any duty of a trustee which entails the use of his personal dis-
cretion is said to be non-delegable. 3
In the instant case, it clearly appeared that the testator vias given the broad
power to appoint the entire interest in the corpus, or any lesser interest, to any of
his descendants. 4 The paramount question was whether the appointing of special
powers to his children to dispose of the remainders after their life estates was a
valid exercise of this power. To put it briefly, may a special power be created out
of a special power? The court, however, said "the question is whether he (the
testator) had the right to delegate the appointment to another or others."5 Relying
mainly on the Restatement of the Law of Property,0 it was held that the testator
1. A power is an authority to do an act in relation to property which the owner might
do. A general power authorizes the transfer of the property, or of any incumbrance on
the property, to any grantee whatever. Any lesser authorization is a special power; ie.,
the power to grant anything less than a fee, or to grant only to certain persons, is a
special power. A power is in trust or beneficial, depending on whether or not persons
other than the grantee are entitlqd to any benefit from its execution. N. Y. REAL Psop.
LAw § 131 et seq. These rules apply equally to personalty. In re Brooklyn Trust Co,
163 Aisc. 117, 295 N. Y. Supp. 1007 (Sup. CL 1936).
2. N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 172. Schreyer v. Schreyer et al., 101 App. Div. 456, 91
N. Y. Supp. 1065 (1st Dep't), aff'd memo, 182 N. Y. 555, 75 N. E. 1134 (1905).
3. Crooke et al. v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 421 (1884); Chaplin, Express Trusts
and Powers § 593 (1897).
4. In re Hart's Will, 262 App. Div. 190, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 781 (Ist Dep't 1941), holding
that "in such manner refers to the estate which the donee may appoint"
5. 100 N. Y. S. 2d 1005, 1007 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
6. 3 Restatement, Property § 359 (2) (1940): "The donee of a special power can
effectively exercise it by creating in an object an interest for life and a special power to
appoint among persons all of whom are objects of the original power, unless the donor
manifests a contrary intent."
7. The children in the instant case renounced the powers granted them in order to
avoid payment of a tax on it. INT. REV. COonE § 811 (f) (2) (A) exempts from taxation
special powers to be exercised in favor of a family group, but subparagraph (B) in the
same section excepts from this exemption a power created from a power. See Eisenstein,
Powers of Appointment and Estate Taxes II, 52 YALE L. J. 494 (1943). Any power may
be renounced by the grantee by a release in writing delivered to any of the four classes of
individuals mentioned in § 183 of the New York Real Property Law. It must be done
within a reasonable time after knowledge of the power, as the court held it was done in
this case. As the testator here had made provision for disposition of the remainder in
default of appointment by his children (Le., remainder after the life estate of each to
go to his or her issue, per stirpes, or, if no issue, then to the surviving brothers and
sisters) the remainder was disposed of in this fashion in harmony with the testator's
expressed intent.
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had created a new and valid power in each of his five children.7 Thus the court's
phrasing of the question in the instant case suggests that the decision stands for the
proposition that a power calling for the use of personal discretion may be dele.
gated, contrary to the general rule stated above. This proposition merits further
analysis.
The reason for the general rule against delegation is found in the intent of the
donor of the power. If the power calls for the use of the personal discretion of
the donee, it is presumed that only his discretion was intended to suffice and an
attempt to substitute another's judgment is considered void, in accordance with the
maxim "delegatus non potest delegare." This would appear to be a sound rule of
construction, but the question remains as to what is a "delegation" within the
meaning of the rule. If the reason for the rule is kept in mind, it will be seen that
only such an exercise of a power as does violence to the testator's intent is invalid,
Let us suppose a testator gives X a life estate and a power to appoint the remainder
in any manner among such members of a class (of which A is a member) as X sees
fit. Thus X could appoint either nothing, the whole, or any intermediate property
interest to A. If X gave the remainder to A in fee simple, A would have the power
to dispose of the property in A's discretion. Since this would be in accordance with
the testator's intent, can it be said that it is any less in accordance with the testa-
tor's intent if, as first supposed, A only received a power to dispose of the prop-
erty? There seems to be no valid reason for saying that it is contrary to the tes-
tator's intent that A should be able to dispose of the property in his discretion in
the latter case but not in the former.
But if this is not a delegation of a discretionary power, and therefore invalid,
what is? It is submitted that such delegation, within the meaning of the above
rule, occurs only when the donee attempts to give the discretionary power over
the property to one whom the donor never intended should have such discretion,
e.g., to one who is not a member of the class intended to be benefited by the donor.
Thus appointing a power to a stranger to the original power would be an invalid
delegation; but appointing a power to an intended beneficiary under the original
power would be valid as a creation of a new power 8-subject always to a contrary
intent of the original donor.9 Therefore, the general statement that, where not ex-
pressly provided for, "a delegation of discretionary power is invalid" is only accu-
rate if a creation of a new power is distinguished from a delegation. That this
is not always done by the courts will be seen from the instant case. It should be
noted at this point that the fact that the new power is created in terms identical
8. Thus where a testator gave A and B each a life estate in one-hllf the corpus, re-
mainder (if the first one dying died without issue) as the survivor should appoint, and
the survivor appointed to his wife for life, remainder as she should appoint, this exercise
of the original power was held valid. Duff v. Rodenkirchen, 110 Misc. 575, 182 N. Y.
Supp. 35 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd without opinion, Duff v. Fox, 193 App. Div. 898, 183
N. Y. Supp. 947 (1st Dep't 1920).
9. This contrary intent need not be expressed as a positive restriction-it may be In-
ferred from the words of his grant. So, for example, when the donor instructed his trustees
to "pay over the principal" as X should appoint by will, it was held that this power
required the corpus to vest wholly on X's death. Therefore, an attempt by X to create
life estates in objects of the original power, remainder as the latter should appoint, was an
invalid exercise of the original power. Matter of Kennedy, 279 N. Y. 255, 18 N. E. 2d
146 (1938).
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with the original power does not transform this exercise of the original power into
a delegation.
It is submitted that the instant case is not a violation of the general rule, since
it does not truly come within the meaning of the rule. No inroad on the true
principle is called for by its facts. The testator created new powers in individuals
who were objects of the original power to the extent that they could have been
given the power of alienation of the property under it. The donor of the original
power did not manifest an intent that no new power should be created. Therefore,
it seems that the testator exercised his discretion in a manner which was in con-
formity with the intent of the donor of the original power, and that the court was
correct in its holding. The powers to the testator's children vere worded similarly
to the original power,10 and this circumstance made the testator's act appear as a
delegation of his own power. It is submitted, however, that the court should not
have referred to this as a delegation, for the reasons stated above, but as a valid
creation of new powers. If this appears to be a terminological quibble, consider the
violence that could be done to testamentary intent should this case be understood
as standing for the proposition that one to whom power to perform a discretionary
act has been granted may appoint another to perform this act for him.
TAxATION---ONSTITUTIONAL LAw-STATE TAXATIo. or FOREIm.; CORPORATIO.
ENGAGED SOLELY m, INTERSTATE CoMMRCE.--Defendant, Tax Commissioner of
Connecticut, assessed a franchise tax on plaintiff trucking firm, using net income
attributable to local activities as a basis for determining the amount of tax. Plaintiff,
a Missouri corporation with administrative headquarters in Illinois, was engaged
solely in interstate commerce. The District Court issued an injunction, holding that
the taxing statute was not intended to apply to plaintiff, for if it were it would be
unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the statute was intended to apply and was constitutional. The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court until the Connecticut courts
had determined the application and constitutionality of the tax as applied to plaintiff
under local law. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors held the tax to apply
to plaintiff and to be a tax or excise upon the franchise of corporations for the
privilege of carrying on or doing business within the state. The District Court re-
fused to dissolve its injunction and the Court of Appeals again reversed. On appeal,
held, reversed, the tax constituted a violation of the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution of the United States. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, - U. S. -,
71 Sup. Ct. 508 (1951).
The decision of this case, one of considerable constitutional significance, has been
eagerly awaited by the parties concerned (having taken eight years and requiring
10. Where the second power is broader than the original power granted (e.g., a general
power created out of a special power), this would also seem to be within the scope of the
testator's intent by a parity of reasoning (i.e., because the donee of the second power could
have been given a fee, which would include the absolute power of disposition) 3 REST,%ru-
mENT PRopERTv § 359 (1) (1940). But see In re McClellan's Estate, 221 Pa. 261, 70 A.
737 (1908). There, X was granted a power to appoint to anyone other than a member
of his family. X gave A a life estate with power to appoint by will. Held, the same limi-
tation would apply to A's power. I
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decisions by eight courts); by students of constitutional law; 1 and by many states
having statutes similar to the Connecticut statute involved.2
This decision is primarily noteworthy for its reaffirmation of the traditional doc-
trine of the exemption from state taxation of the privilege of engaging exclusively
in interstate business. The Court in its opinion explicitly "restores to full vigor"
the decisions in cases forming the foundation of that doctrine.3 On both occasions
when this case was before it, the Court of Appeals 4 based its decisions on the belief
that these decisions were no longer controlling and that the present trend in Supreme
Court decisions seemed to indicate that a tax such as this would be sustained. The
doubts raised by the Court of Appeals have been shown to be unfounded and the ques-
tion answered with finality. The tax was for the privilege of doing business within the
state and as the only business done was interstate the tax was invalid.
In the past, most of the cases which have considered the conflicting claims of
the state taxing power and the commerce clause, as well as those authorities com-
menting on the cases, 6 have applied one of two criteria as a basis of judgment.
The multiple burden test 7 invalidates those taxes on interstate commerce which are
susceptible of being imposed with equal right by other states, so that interstate
commerce is required to bear a heavier burden of taxation than intrastate commerce.8
Fair apportionment and the non-discriminatory character of the tax are the founda-
tions of this rule. The direct-indirect test O invalidates those taxes which directly
burden interstate commerce.10 The crux of this test is whether the tax is on net
1. This case, in the various stages of its litigation, has been noted in:, 20 No'nra DAME
LAW. 170 (1944); 44 COL. L. REv. 565 (1944); 57 HARv. L. Rav. 573 (1944); 1 STAN. L.
REv. 55 (1949); 96 U. or PA. L. REv. 274 (1947).
2. The statute involved in this case is CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 1896 et seq. (1949).
3. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203
(1925) ; Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier et al., 266 U. S. 555 (1925).
4. 139 F. 2d 809 (2d Cir. 1944); 181 F. 2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950).
5. The cases within the asserted trend are cited in notes 8 and 10 infra.
6. Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 COL. L. REV. 211
(1947); Powell, More Ado About Gross Receipts Taxes, 60 HARv. L. REV. 501 (1947);
Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportation and Communication, 47
HARv. L. REv. 40 (1943).
7. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey et al, 334 U. S. 653 (1948); McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940); Western Live Stock et al. v.
Bureau of Revenue et al., 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
8. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 181 F. 2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950). While an
application of the multiple burden test was not required in the instant case, It would
seem that the tax involved should have been invalidated if such an appraisal were made
since there was present a great possibility of multiple taxation. In addition to the tax
levied by Connecticut on the portion of its business within that state plaintiff would be
liable to a tax on its entire net income by the state of its domicile and most probably to
a similar tax by the state or states where it has a commercial domicile. ArTMAN AND
KEmsLn o, ALLocATioN or INCOME 3N STATE TAXATION 32-4 (2d ed. 1950).
9. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422 (1947); Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946); United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S.
321 (1918).
10. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 181 F. 2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950).
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or gross income.'1 The instant case brings forth very lucidly the fact that these
tests are concerned with matters of a purely secondary nature. When the incidence
of the tax has been established as valid it is then proper, and not before, to consider
the fairness of the tax in order to determine whether it should be upheld. If a tax
is of a type beyond the scope of the state taxing authority, no amount of effort
taken to keep the levy within bounds will justify it.le Where the tax is on the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce it is invalid, no matter how justly
apportioned.' 3
The financial burden is a secondary question, since the prime concern of the
court is to determine whether the channel through which it is to be obtained is
constitutional. A state may tax a state-conferred privilege, such as highway use,1 4
property,15 license or gasoline' 0 taxes, but it may not acquire the same funds by
levying a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, for to do so would
be to "levy an excise directly upon the privilege of carrying on an activity which
is neither derived from the state, nor within its power to forbid."'
Also emphasized is the necessity of defining with precision the tax and the activities
involved in a particular instance. A tax, invalid becase the business was exclusively
interstate, might be valid if there were both interstate and intrastate business.18
A tax on business activity which is sufficiently local in nature would be valid while
a tax on a "local event" which is so much a part of interstate commerce as to be
11. United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918). An analysis
and application of this test, while not required for the decision, must also call for the
invalidation of the present tax. While it is measured by net income, and thus merely
creates an indirect burden, it amounts practically to a tax on gross income thereby
creating a direct burden. This may be seen from the fact that the statute refused to
allow a deduction for "rent" in arriving at net income, and that sixty per cent of plaintiff's
operating expense was the cost of renting trucks. It is significant to note that during
the course of this litigation the statute was amended so as to permit this deduction.
Cosnsx. Rxv. GEN. STAT. § 1898 (1949).
12. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940). Hughes,
C. J., points out in his dissent that simply because a state could impose a direct tax on
its own commerce it is not given the authority to levy a similar tax on interstate com-
merce. Id. at 66.
13. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co. et al., 322 U. S. 327 (1944).
14. Capitol Greyhound Lines et al. v. Brice, 339 U. S. 542 (1950).
15. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662 (1949).
16. Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n et al, 306 U. S. 72 (1939).
17. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F. 2d 809, 822 (2d Cir. 1944). This
comment was made by Learned Hand, J., in his disent.
18. In Matson Navigation Co. el al. v. State Board of Equalization of California, 297
U. S. 441 (1936), it was contended that the California Bank and Franchise Tax Act
should only be applied to net income attributable to intrastate business whereas the Tax
Commissioner included income derived from interstate and foreign commerce but at-
tributable to California. The basis for this contention was that the Act failed to tax
foreign corporations exclusively engaged in interstate and foreign commerce in California
and thus constituted a denial of equal protection of laws. The Court stated that there
was no merit to the contention since "A foreign corporation whose sole business in
California is interstate and foreign commerce cannot be subjected to the tax in question."
Id. at 446, citing Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 (1925).
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in effect a tax upon interstate business is invalid.' 9
Interstate commerce does not have the freedom from state taxation it once en-
joyed.20 "Interstate commerce must pay its way" is the maxim now being applied
by the courts.21 It would seem, however, as pointed out by the dissent in the instant
case, that the proper label must be applied before interstate commerce can be
compelled to pay its way.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DRINKING HARMFUL LIQUID AS RESULT OF A PRANK
-INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN COURSE OF EmPLOYMENT.-An employee, con-
trary to company rules, accepted a drink from a co-employee during working hours,
thinking that it was gin. The bottle contained carbon tetrachloride, a fact known to
the co-employee but deliberately concealed from claimant in order to perpetrate a
prank upon him. Severe damage to claimant's internal organs resulted and he seeks
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Laws. Held, three judges dis-
senting, the injury arose out of and in the course of the claimant's employment
since he was the innocent victim of horseplay. Matter of Bunts v. Merritt Engineer-
ing Co. et al., 302 N. Y. 131, 96 N. E. 2d 739 (1951).
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Laws is to shift the burden of
providing support and care for injured workmen from public and private charities
to industry and ultimately to the consumer.' The right to compensation is not
limited by the common law rules of negligence2 but compensation is awarded for
injuries "arising out of and in the course of the employment, without regard to
fault. . ... ,a "In the course of the employment" refers to the time, place and
circumstances of the occurrence of the injury; "arising out of" the employment is
concerned more with the origin and cause of the accident. 4 The proof of one without
the other will not bring the case within the act.5 Since claimant's injury clearly
occurred in the course of his employment the sole question in the instant case, is,
as the court points out, whether it arose out of his employment. This phrase has
been construed broadly in order to effectuate the evident purpose and intent of the
statute.6 While there is no precise definition of the term, there must be at least
a causal connection between the condition under which the work is required to be
performed and the resultant injury.7 This causal connection appears to be some-
19. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80 (1948).
20. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 298 (U. S. 1851).
21. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688 (1895).
1. Stark v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 103 Ore. 80, 204 Pac. 151 (1922).
2. New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917). "In support of the
legislation, it is said that the whole common-law doctrine of employer's liability for
negligence, with its defenses of contributory negligence, fellow-servant's negligence, and
assumption of risk, is based upon fictions and is inapplicable to modern conditions of
employment. . . ." Id. at 197.
3. N. Y. WORK. ComP. LAW § 10.
4. I. T. I. Co. et al. v. Lewis et al., 165 Okla. 26, 24 P. 2d 647 (1933).
5. In re Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd., 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913).
6. Stark v. State Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 103 Ore. 80, 204 Pac. 151 (1922).
7. In re Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd., 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1913).
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thing less than the requirement of proximate cause in torts.8
In holding that the injury arose out of the employment, the court in the instant
case considered the claimant an innocent victim of horseplay. It has generally been
held that no recovery is allowed for injuries sustained through horseplay if these acts
are not connected with the performance of any duty of the employment;0 and the
aggressor or initiator'of the horseplay cannot recover if he is injured. 10 In some
cases compensation has been denied even though the injured employee has not par-
ticipated in the horseplay' 1 but the better rule permits the non-participating victim
of the horseplay to be compensated for his injuries. 2 Another well recognized ex-
ception to the general rule arises where the employer actually knew or should have
known that his employees frequently engaged in horseplay while on the job and he
took no steps to prevent it. It is then held that the horseplay is a natural hazard
or element of the employment and recovery is allowed.23
In the instant case the majority brings the claimant within the horseplay rule
by considering him as an innocent victim of the cruel joke of his fellow employee.
Whether the claimant knew of the rule prohibiting drinking on the job or not was
held not to be determinative in considering whether or not the injury arose out of the
employmenL In support of this position the court cited decisions which allowed
recovery where the employee was performing an act which it was his duty to per-
form but which he was doing in a forbidden manner.' 4 In Matter of Chila . New
S. Truck Insurance Exchange v. Industrial Accident Comm'n et al., 27 Cal. 2d 813,
167 P. 2d 705 (1946).
9. McKnight v. Houck et a!., 87 Colo. 234, 286 Pac. 279 (1930); Payne v. Industrial
Comm'n et a., 295 flL 388, 129 N. E. 122 (1920); DeFilippis v. Falkenberg, 170 App.
Div. 153, 155 N. Y. Supp. 761 (3d Dep't 1915), aff'd without opinion, 219 N. Y. 5S1,
144 N. E. 1064 (1915).
10. Frost v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 204 App. Div. 700, 198 N. Y. Supp. S21 (3d
Dep't 1923), aff'd without opinion, 236 N. Y. 649, 142 N. E. 319 (1923).
11. Porter v. New Haven, 105 Conn. 394, 135 At. 293 (1926); Steffes v. Ford Motor
Co., 239 Mich. 501, 214 N. W. 953 (1927); Powers v. Y. M. C. A., 17 N. J. Misc. 261,
8 A. 2d 189 (1939).
12. In Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Conm'n et at., 26 Cal. 2d 286,
158 P. 2d 9 (1945), the court allowed a non-participating victim of hot mplay to recover and
thereby overruled a long line of cases denying recovery. See also Pekin Cooperage Co.
v. Industrial Board et al., 277 11. 53, 115 N. E. 128 (1917); Leonbruno v. Champlain
Silk Mills et al., 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920). Where the injured employee has
been the victim of horseplay and has turned on his aggrEssor only to receive his injury
in the ensuing scuffle, he has been allowed to recover. Matter of Verschleiser v. Stem &
Son et al., 229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126 (1920). But if he counter-attacks with such
viciousness that he abandons his employment, recovery is barred. Stein v. Williams
Printing Co., 195 App. Div. 336, 186 N. Y. Supp. 705 (3d Dep't 1921).
13. Glenn et a!. v. Reynold's Spring Co. et al., 225 Mich. 693, 196 N. W. 617 (1924),
Matter of Industrial Comm'r v. McCarthy et al., 295 N. Y. 443, 6S N. E. 2d 434 (1946).
14. Matter of Burns v. Merritt Engineering Co. et al., 302 N. Y. 131, 134, 96 N. E.
2d 739, 741 (1951). See Matter of Brenchley v. International Heater Co., 227 App. Div.
831, 237 N. Y. Supp. 733 (3d Dep't 1929), afl'd %ithout opinion, 254 N. Y. 536, 173 N. E.
854 (1930) (Deceased crushed by a descending elevator while attempting to do some
insulation work inside of the elevator shaft. He had been instructed not to enter the
shaft).
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York Central R. R.15 the employee's duties included cleaning two towers. He was
instructed not to cross the railroad'tracks to go from one tower to another but to
use the street. He was killed while using the tracks. It was held that as a matter
of law the accident arose out of and in the course of decedent's employment. And
in Fox v. Truslow & Fulle, Inc.16 the deceased's duties included cleaning her machine
but she was strictly forbidden to clean it- while it was in inotion. Although she
received her fatal injury while disobeying this instruction recovery was allowed.
It is submitted that claimant's position is rather within that line of cases which
forbids recovery to the employee who is injured while participating in an act which
his employer has absolutely forbidden and which is not a part of his employment.
In Yodakis v. Smith & Sons Carpet Co.17 claimant was injured while attempting to
put an abrasive on a machine belt to speed up the operation of the machine. An
award was denied since his employer had provided a special group of men to do all
repair work including the act claimant was performing while injured. In Ebbermann
v. Walther & Co.18 the employer had expressly forbidden his employees to use a
certain elevator. Since deceased met his death while disobeying this rule there
could be no recovery. And in Matter of Redino v. Continental Can Co., et al.,1
the claimant was employed to dip cans in a liquid. On the day of the accident,
having finished his own work he attempted to operate a stamping machine in viola-
tion of the orders of his employer and received injuries. Recovery was denied
since the injury did not arise out of the course of the employment.
The determining element seems to be whether the order which was disobeyed was
a direction as to how to do certain things within the sphere of the employment or
whether the order actually limited the sphere of the workmen's employment.
20 It
would seem that the order in question limited the sphere of the employment and
it would also seem that the employee left that sphere when he accepted the drink
contrary to plant rules. Since recovery has been denied to injured employees be-
cause they have used a forbidden instrumentality or machine21 or because the injury
occurred while attempting to repair a machine contrary to orders,2 2 it is extremely
difficult to justify an award of compensation to one who in doing the prohibited
act seems to have voluntarily abandoned his employment. It should be noted that
the injury in the instant case would not have been sustained but for the voluntary
act of the employee whereas in the usual horseplay case, the injury is the direct
result of an act of a co-employee.
15. 251 App. Div., 575, 297 N. Y. Supp. 850 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd without opinion,
275 N. Y. 585, 11 N. E. 2d 766 (1937).
16. 204 App. Div. 584, 198 N. Y. Supp. 735 (3d Dep't 1923), aff'd without opinion,
236 N. Y. 634, 142 N. E. 314 (1923).
17. 193 App. Div. 150, 183 N. Y. Supp. 768 (3d Dep't 1920), aff'd without opinion,
230 N. Y. 593, 130 N. E. 907 (1921).
18. 209 App. Div. 248, 204 N. Y. Supp. 406 (3d Dep't 1924).
19. 226 N. Y. 565, 123 N. E. 886 (1919), mem. reversing, 186 App. Div. 924, 172
N. Y. Supp. 916 (3d Dep't 1918).
20. Macechko v. Bowen Mfg. Co., 179 App. Div. 573, 166 N. Y. Supp. 822 (3d Dep't
1917).
21. Ebbermann v. Walther & Co., 209 App. Div. 248, 204 N. Y. Supp. 406 (3d Dep't
1924). Matter of Rendino v. Continental Can Co. et al., 226 N. Y. 565, 123 N. E.
886 (1919), inem. reversing, 186 App. Div. 924, 172 N. Y. Supp. 916 (3d Dep't 1918).
22. Yodakis v. Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 193 App. Div. 150, 183 N. Y. Supp. 768
(3d Dep't 1920), aff'd without opinion, 230 N. Y. 593, 130 N. E. 907 (1921).
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If the employee actually remains within the sphere of his employment, the fact
that he breaks rules governing the manner of performing his duties will not bar
recovery. Thus in Matter of State Treasurer v. Ulysses Apartments, Inc.P the
employee met his death while smoking in violation of the orders of his employer
while using an inflammable paint remover. The award was sustained since the death
arose out of the employment. It would seem that this employee was furthering his
master's interest and performing his duties of employment although doing it in
a dangerous and forbidden manner. The claimant in the instant case did not appear
to be performing any duty of his employment.
In its opinion the majority suggests that the test should be "whether the injurious
horseplay may reasonably be regarded as an incident of the employment . . . rather
than the foreseeability of a particular prank."'2 4 The rule is a sound one but it
seems difficult to understand how the "prank" in the instant case can reasonably ba
regarded as an incident of any employment.
The instant case, along with other recent decisions, indicates the current tendency
of the courts to permit recovery even in the absence of a causal connection betveen
the injury and the conditions under which the work is required to be performed.p
The trend indicates that the employer is becoming more and more an insurer of
his employees instead of merely being liable for injuries arising out of and in the
course of the employment.
23. 232 App. Div. 393, 250 N. Y. Supp. 190 (3d Dep't 1931).
24. 302 N. Y. 131, 135, 96 N. E. 2d 739, 741 (1951).
25. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala. 675, 32 So. 2d 666 (1947). Hillyard
v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 Kan. 177, 211 P. 2d 89 (1949); Dion's Case, 324
Mass. 102, 85 N. E. 2d 69 (1949); Masse v. James H. Robinson Co. Inc. et al, 301 N. Y. 34,
92 N. E. 2d 56 (1950).
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